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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The process through which commercial bankers reach 
their lending decisions have often been a mystery to 
outside observers and to those who haye'fefeen rejected in
i,
their applications for credit:
"In the folklore of commercial banking, 
there exists a powerful personality known as 
a loan officer, who is gifted with certain 
supernatural and intuitive insights. This 
individual has been heralded in stories over 
the years as having a cold, penetrating eye 
which sees the innermost thoughts of the 
applicant for credit. By neatly balancing a 
wide_ range of factors, he arrives at somewhat 
mystircal decisions that particular loans 
should or should not be made."
Perhaps the' most difficult decision to understand of all
in the commercial bank lending function is the corporate
lending decision; that is, how the commercial bank decides
whether or not to lend money to a corporation.
Much has been written concerning individual aspects
of this process of making a corporate lending decision,
but few substantial efforts have been made to develop.a
structured, systematic guide to corporate credit
_ — -  , —
Roger F. Murray, "Evaluating Credit Worthiness", in 
Business Loans of American Commercial Banks, ed. by 
Benjamin Haggot Beckhart (New York: The Ronald Press
Company, 1959), p. 74.
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evaluation. Corporate lending officers of commercial banks 
have instead relied heavily on vast credit experience, 
accumulated analytical knowledge and long-time bank 
relationships with.their corporate customers to evaluate 
the corporations' credit applications. In addition, they 
have been reluctant to discuss why they are willing to grant 
or reject loans. In rejecting a loan application, the 
lending officer;often points to one particular aspect of 
the corporation which he feels precludes its eligibility 
for credit, but often his rejection is based on some vague, 
collection of factors which he seems unable to quantify.
Individual banks often have written policies defining 
prerequisite corporations-banks relationships, but these 
policies have not provided step by step analytical guides 
to corporate credit evaluation. The banks have instead
lrelied on the experience of their corporate lending officers 
to provide safe; and profitable loan portfolios. Most banks 
have felt little need, therefore, to.produce structured 
guides to corporate credit evaluation.
However, with our*rapidly growing econoky, younger, 
less-experienced corporate lending officers are being 
placed in positions to make substantial credit-decisions., 
Moreover, lending officers have been faced with making : 
credit decisions for many small, diverse, and yet, often 
very profitable corporations. Without a, broad background
3
of credit experience on which to draw, and sometimes 
possessing limited analytical knowledge, these officers 
may reach decisions which .do not- take fully into 
consideration all aspects of overall financial strength 
and repayment ability. To insure consideration of all 
pertinent credit factors under these circumstances, a 
structured analytical lending guide would be a valuable 
tool.
Often a corporation requires that a decision be made 
on its application promptly, or that it at least be given 
an indication as to whether its application for credit 
might be approved. Again, some sort- of guide which would 
lend itself to a few critical, yet quick, calculations 
would be helpful to the lending officer in making this 
preliminary determination.
The primary objectives of this study are to: 1)
Identify those, factors which commercial bankers consider 
most important in granting credit to corporations, 2) 
determine if bankers actually use these criteria in making 
the loan decisions/ 3) evaluate the significance of these 
criteria, 4) discuss other criteria that might be useful 
to the corporate lending officer, aan#'‘v5) develop from this 
evaluation a structured guide to corporate credit 
evaluation which, in turn, could be the starting point from 
which a major .bank, with the aid of a computer and data 
collected over several years, could develop a workable guide.
Therefore, this study will seek to devise a set of criteria 
which will incorporate those factors deemed most relevant 
in making a sound corporate decision and place them in a 
logical, workable sequence.
For a number of years many banks have successfully 
used various methods of "credit scoring" to assist lending 
officers in making decisions regarding consumer credit 
applications. The Bank of America, for example, uses a 
scoring which takes into consideration factors, such as the 
applicant's salary/ monthly financial obligations, length 
of employment, and marital status; and assigns various 
numerical weights to these items„ With the aid of a 
computer, the Bank of America arrived at a minimum score 
which provides a certain degree of confidence as to the 
probability of a loan being repaid as stipulated in a 
proposed loan agreement. An applicant who scores under, 
this minimum is either rejected, or in special situations, 
will be granted a.loan only with the concurrence of a 
second loan officer* This method of scoring was developed 
from the performance data, of hundreds of thousands of loans 
over a period of years.
Because of the many variables, both quantitative and 
qualitative, in.corporate credit evaluations, the corporate 
lending decision will -probably never be reduced to a simple 
mathematical formula. A certain degree of human judgment
5
will no doubt always be necessary. This study will
necessarily be limited, then, to an attempt at helping
the corporate lending officer function more effectively
rather than^seeking to eliminate his function.
This is not to say that the corporate lending
function does not lend itself to credit scoring. A recent
article in Bankers Monthly Magazine suggests both the value
of developing such a credit scoring system and a general
2approach that could be taken. The author of this article,
Robert P. Abate, in pointing out the value of using a
scoring system,.estimates that such a device would save the
corporate lending officer from 25 to 50 per cent of the
3time spent in loan evaluation. Although, not claiming to 
have developed a "scientifically designed" corporate 
scoring guide, Abate has prepared an. example of such a form 
(see Figure 1). The possibilities suggested in this article 
and. personal working experience with Bank of America's 
consumer credit scoring sheet prompted the development and 
testing of, the experimental corporate,loan rating sheet to 
be discussed in Chapters III and IV.
Robert P. Abate, "Numerical Scoring System for 
Commercial Loans", Bankers Monthly Magazine, January 15, 
1969, pp. 38-39+.
3 Ibid., p . 50.
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FIGURE 1
SAMPLE CONVENIENT CREDIT SCORING GUIDE
Age ot business
Under 1 
year 
1
1 -3  years 
7
4-7  years 
19
3-12  years 
36
13-21
years
49
22 years 
& over 
67
Years of present management
Under 1 
year 
1
1-3  years 
6
4 -7  years 
17
8-12  years 
32
13-21
years
45
22 years 
& over 
59
Successive years of 
increased profit
Loss
-1 0
2 years 
3
3 years 
7
4 -5  years 
12
6 -8  years 
30
9-12  years 
47
13 & over 
62
Num ber of days inventory
Over 210 
1
180-209
3
150-179
5
120-149
8
90-110
12
60-89
22
30-59
53
Under 30 
72
Num ber o’f days receivables
Over 210 
1
180-209
3
150-179
6
120-149
9
90-110
14
60-89
28
30-59
57
Under 30 
70
Debt to net worth
Over 10-1  
1
9 -8  times 
3
7 -5  times 
5
4 -3  times 
15
2 times 
25
1-1  times 
35
1 -2  times 
52
1 -3  or 
better  
70
Trade reports
Suits & 
judgements
1
All sloW 
2
Mixed slow 
& satis­
factory
5
All satis­
factory
20
Pays 
prom pt & 
takes all 
discount 
40
Industry groups— M fg.
(i.e ., Group 1, furniture m fgr.; 
Group IX , lumber m fg r j
Group 1 
1
I I  
. 5
i l l
10
IV
15
V
19
V I
24
V I I
29
V l t l
• 33
„  IX  
38
Audit
Own audit 
1
Qualified
audit
20
< .
Unquali­
fied adt. 
unknown 
CPA firm  
40
Unquali­
fied adt.
. known 
CPA firm  
60
Sources Robert P. Abate, "Numerical Scoring System for 
Commercial Loans," Bankers Monthly Magazine, 
January 15» 19&9* P« 39•
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Throughout the text- of this paper there will be 
references to "senior corporate lending officer(s) of 
leading California banks" and "local (or MissoulaMontana 
area) bank corporate lending officeirs*s" Prior to the 
development of this text* several informal- interviews were 
conducted with a number of:the above, described individuals 
in order to get . a better feeling for corporate lending 
policies of commercial banks. These vague references 
reflect the desire of these>individuals to not be quoted 
directly as they do not want their views to be interpreted 
as necessarily reflecting the official policy of their 
respective banks.
CHAPTER II
PROFIT CONSIDERATIONS OF COMMERCIAL BANKS
Before turning to bank lending policies, a look at 
profit considerations of commercial banks with respect to 
recent trends and future expectations will be useful in 
establishing what role profitability plays in determining 
the composition of the loan portfolio of a commercial bank. 
An examination of these factors will also point out why it 
is so important to commercial banks to grant only low-risk 
loans. Cohen points out that:
"There appear to be three different 
objectives which commercial banks try to attain 
in their business loan decisions: minimizing
risk to the bank (both default risk and 
liquidity risk), maximizing the bank's profit, 
and maximizing the', bank's service to the 
community."
Nadler adds to this by pointing out that banks are clothed 
in the public interest:
"A commercial bank is a business, and like 
any other business enterprise, it is out to make 
a profit. Yet unlike most other businesses, a 
bank has a deeper obligation than most enterprises 
, to maintain high standards of safety and soundness
4 Kalman J. Cohen, Thomas C. Gilmore, and Frank A. 
Singer, "Bank Procedures for Analyzing Business Loan 
Applications", in Analytical Methods in Banking, (Ed. by 
Kalman J. Cohen and Frederick S. Hammer), (Homewood, 
Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1966) p. 222.
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in its operations, for a bank's operations 
involve the acceptance and safekeeping of 
other people's money. For this reason banks 
are subject to considerable regulation on top 
of the self-regulation they musg exercise to 
maintain depositor confidence."
In addition to the close scrutiny and frequent inspection
of commercial banks by the federal government, the
Federal Reserve System also influences bank lending
activity as its primary means of slowing or increasing
economic activity. Thus, banks are not completely free
to choose those policies which will best meet their
profit needs.
Commercial banks have been able to operate on very
narrow profit margins. As can be seen by Figure 2, return
on total assets has been less than one per cent and has
even been declining in recent years to just 0.73 per cent
in 1968. The extrema?use of leverage employed by commercial
banks has enabled them to still yield generally increasing
profits. Figure 3 shows that the average capitalization
of commercial banks has consistently been less than ten
per cent of total assets and has declined from 8.1 per cent
in 1969 to 7.5 per cent in 1968. The advantages accrued
to commercial banks by extensively using leverage is
illustrated by Nadler in a recent article in Banking .
_____
Paul S. Nadler, Commgrcial Banking in the Economy, 
(New York: Random House > 1968), p . 47.
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FIGURE 2
SELECTED RATES OF RETURN FOR COMMERCIAL BANKS
(Percentages)
10 i
9 
8
7
6
5
3 
2 
1 •
0 «* i
60
T "
61
i
62
Return on 
Capital
Return on 
Loans
Return on U.S 
Government 
Securities
on
Total Assets
T "
63
" T ”
Sk 65 66 6? 68
Source: Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Annual Report:
1968, Washington, D.C., May 1, .1969, p. 200.
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FIGURE 3
COMPOSITE COMMERCIAL BANK LIABILITY AND CAPITAL STRUCTURE
(Percentages)
7.5> Total capital8.08..1
4.1 4.6 5.4V Borrowings and-< other liabilitie
>. Time and savings 
. deposits
> Demand deposits
60 6l 62 66 68
Source: Derived from data contained in: Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation, Annual Report: 1968, 
Washington, D*C., May 1, 1969, p. 199.
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magazine:
"If one bank has $10 of capital for each 
$100 of deposits, while another can operate 
with only $6 of capital to $100 of deposits, 
obviously it is far easier for the more highly 
leveraged bank to earn a better return on 
capital than the bank with the greater equity 
cushion to deposits can. Carried to an extreme, 
if two banks are identical in deposit size and 
earning capacity, but one has twice the capital 
of the other, the bank with the lower capital 
position should earn roughly twice as much on 
capital as the other institution."
Leverage* in itself, implies the profitable use of the 
funds of others. For a. number of years commercial banks 
received considerable deposits virtually free. That is, 
individuals and corporations deposited funds with the bank 
and the bank was able to invest these funds profitably and 
still cover the costs of maintaining these deposit accounts. 
As Faulstich suggests, these circumstances continued for 
several years following World War II:
"Acquiring low-cost funds— principally 
demand deposits— had not been a problem for 
banks, and it was logical for them to continue 7 
focusing attention on how best to invest funds."
However, in recent years corporate treasurers have become
increasingly aware of the earnings lost by keeping large
cash balances idle. Consequently, they have sought to
invest excess funds in either short-term securities or in
time deposits with commercial banks. As can be seen by
6 Paul S. Nadler, "Measuring Bank Performance Today", 
Banking, June 1970, p. 36.
7 George L. Faulstich, Jr., "How Reliable is the Loan/ 
Deposit Ratio?", Banking, October 1969, p. 33.
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Figure 3, in recent years the percentage of "free" demand.
deposits has dropped sharply and the percentage of deposits
the bank must "purchase" has risen proportionately. And
besides paying for more^derosits, the interest paid on these
deposits has risen.substantially as indicated by Bunting:
'■Because of rising interest payments alone? the average
break-even point of the banks in our survey tripled in less
8than eight, years.1" As a result of these trends, banks have
been. " . . .  forced . . . tO' divert increasing attention to
9the liability side of the balance sheet."
In addition to the increased use of leverage, which 
has already been discussed, commercial banks have.already 
made considerable,efforts at counteracting this profit 
squeeze through changes in asset management. Figure 2 
shows.that banks earn a: considerably higher rate of return 
on loans than they do on U.S. Government securities. As a 
result, banks have increased the size of their loan port­
folios while at the same time Reducing' significantly their 
holdings of U. S. Government securities (see Figure 4); 
which are, of course, a .bank's safest and most liquid 
investment. As a compromise> many banks have increased 
substantially their investments in municipal, bonds (included
8 John B. Bunting, Jr., "One-Bank Holding Companies:
A Banker's View", Harvard Business.Review, May-June 1969,
p. 100. •
9 Faulstich, p. 33.
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FIGURE. 4;
COMPOSITE COMMERCIAL BANK ASSET STRUCTURE
(Percentage)
Other assets-
•Cash and due from 
hanks
>>Other securities
U.S. Government
securities23 23
46
>Loans and discounts
s
Source: Derived from data contained In: Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation, Annual Report: 19&8, 
Washington, D.C., May l~~T'969't~~p7 199.
15
under "other securities" in Figure 4). Because of their
tax-exempt status, the after-tax yield on. municipal bonds
can almost, equal the return on a loan. Faulstich, in fact,
suggests: " . . .  that the.most progressive and profit-
oriented banks will increasingly take maximum advantage of
10this investment alternative." However, as banks have 
long catered to the needs of corporate interests and have 
realized increasing returns on consumer loan^, it is doubt­
ful that they will increase the size of their municipal bond 
portfolios to the exclusion of loans. Perhaps taking heed 
from corporate treasurers, bankers have also reduced their, 
cash positions (see Figure. 4).
As banks operate on very narrow profit margins and have 
limited capitalization, loan losses are extremely detrimental 
to both capital and income. For example., considering the 
return on total assets (0.73%) and return on loans (6.88%) 
as shown,in Figure 3, approximately $137,000 in assets 
would have had to be profitably employed to make up a 
$1,000 loan, loss in 1968. Similarly, gross revenues from a 
$14,550 loan would be necessary to make up this loss. With 
this in mind, banks are generally considered to be conservative 
in their loan policies.
10.Faulstich, p. 33.
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Despite constricting profit margins and the continuous 
need for changing strategies, commercial banks have been 
able to maintain increasing profits, in fact:
"During the decade of the '60s, earnings 
per share for 25 leading bank stocks increased 
at an average rate of 7.1% per year, compared 
with 5.2% for all Dow Jones industrials and 
6.0% for the Dow Jones utilities. During the 
last half of the decade, the banks showed an 
average increase of 9.3% per year which was 
more than double the rate of increase of either 
the industrials or the utilities. " H
As solutions to profit problems are being found, however,
new demands are made which tax the ingenuity of bankers,
and there is no conclusive evidence that the trend of
increasing profits will continue uninterruptedly. However,
Adams found in his survey that:
"In the opinion of the bankers, economists, 
and analysts who participated in our survey, banks 
will have good opportunities to develop new 
sources of income during the '70s. All three 
groups believe that earnings should benefit 
appreciably by the development of new services and 
entry into new markets."^
In discussing the future of commercial banking, Adams goes
on to say that the banks will have to develop new sources of
13funds to include nondeposit sources. and will probably be
11E. Sherman Adams, "Challenges Ahead for Bank 
Management/" Banking, June 197 0, p. 58.
12 Ibid., p . 55.
13Ibid., p. 52,
forced to take into consideration the needs of society
14which might be at the sacrifice of profits, Nadler 
suggests that commercial banks might be in for additional 
problems with regard to earnings on capital " . . .  if the 
high leverage position of commercial banks is only a 
temporary phenomenon, and the bank examiners . . . force
the bank[s.4: to raise new capital in the near future . . . .
Considering the potential profit problems of commercial 
banks and their additional responsibilities of protecting 
depositors, servicing the community and helping control the 
economy, the quality of the commercial bank's loan port­
folio will be a continuing and increasing concern.
14Ibid., p. 55.
15Hadler, "Measuring Performance", p. 36.
CHAPTER III
AN EXPERIMENTAL CORPORATE LOAN RATING SHEET
There are a number of different approaches used by 
corporate lending officers in loan evaluation. As 
discussed in Chapter II, the commercial banker, from an 
investment standpoint, is primarily interested in 
generating a reasonable return to the bank from a loan to 
a corporation and in protecting the bank's principal.
Although there seems to be a reluctance on the part 
of corporate lending officers to discuss how accounting
and the analytical process are applied to the lending
\
decision,. a number of recurring factors appear. Perhaps 
the most frequent response in questioning an officer with 
regard to the declination of a loan is simply "they didn't 
havferenough equity capital". The importance of this item 
and many others will be discussed later in this chapter.
Informal "talks with several senior corporate lending 
officers employed by some of the nation's largest banks 
located in California resulted in a number of somewhat 
surprising revelations. Many of these officers professed 
to not having any superior analytical skills. Many, 
insteadrelied heavily upon their intuition and the 
apparent honesty or integrity of the applying corporation's
19
principals, coupled with the managerial skills of these 
individuals. This is not to say that these lending officers 
do not analyze corporate financial statements. However, 
some loan officers claim to make only superficial evaluations 
of available,; statements and in many cases the evaluation of 
the'individuals'involved,rather than the Absolute financial 
strength of the corporation,•is the determining factor as 
to whether a loan will or will not be granted.
This same stress on the importance of personalities 
was revealed in talking with corporate lending officers in 
Missoula. Because of ..Missoula's relatively small and 
nontransient population, the banker is more familiar with 
the character and reputation of corporate principals, and 
can, therefore, more readily grant loans on this basis.
Here again,, financial statements are not ignored but may be 
subordinate to the officer's qualitative evaluation.
To suggest that the lending decisons of corporate 
lending officers are arbitrary would be fallacious. The 
banker looks primarily at the prospects for continued 
profitability of a firm to insure the payment of interest 
and the repayment of principal as stipulated in the 
proposed loan agreement. A detailed financial analysis is 
often required to make this determination.
20
A major.goal of the present study is to determine 
those factors deemed most important, from the standpoint of 
the banker in granting credit to a corporation. Hodgman 
(mentioned in Chapter I) attempted to provide an insight 
into the methods of commercial bankers through interviews 
and found:
" . . .  [Tjhe criteria which bankers apply 
in judging the desirability of individual loan 
requests are the following: the deposit
relationship of the borrower; the credit rating 
of the borrower and the type and marketability 
of the collateral if the loan is to be. secured; 
the existence or prospect of a long-term customer 
relationship with the borrower; the contract rate 
of* interest; the purpose for which the loan is 
requested; whether for seasonal needs, capital, 
or speculative purposes; and the liquidity of the 
loan, particularly as reflected in its pay-out 
schedule."
Although incomplete, this list does indicate a ntlmber of 
areas which are t>f interest to the corporate lending 
officer.
Abate's article, in Bankers Monthly Magazine, discussed 
in Chapter I, suggests that a numerical scoring system for 
corporate loan evaluation is feasible. That is, a number 
of factors concerning a corporation are,assigned numerical 
values and the total value (score) suggests the relative 
merits of the corporation's loan request. Corporations 
with higher scores would, therefore, have greater ability
1 6xpDonald R. Hodgman;, Commercial Bank Loarf. and 
Investment Policy, (Champaign,. Illinois: University of
Illinois, 1963), p. 24.
21
and willingness to meet the repayment terms of their loan 
commitment.
In developing the experimental loan rating sheet used 
in this study (see Figure 5), Abate's article was used as 
a starting point. Items on the rating sheet were drawn 
from Hodgman's study (see Page 20 J, .other, soutces 
cited, and personal experience. These items were felt to 
be most pertinent to corporate lending officers and should 
be, readily discernable from information provided at the 
ixiitial contact of a prospective borrower with a bank. Many 
factors, although important to the financial evaluation of 
firms in a particular industry, are not common to other 
industries. For example, inventory to sales ratios are not 
pertinent to a service industry. Therefore, items which 
are not generally applicable to all industries have been 
eliminated from the rating sheet,. As no weighting system, 
or for that matter, no scoring system of this type apparently 
exists; the weighting of items on this rating sheet is 
somewhat experimental; but based, however, on overall 
impressions reached from studies of various sources.
Following is an item by item description of the various 
items on the rating sheet and justification for the 
inclusion and weighting of each of these items. There.is 
no attempt to suggest that this particular corporate loan 
rating sheet’is a final, tested evaluation tool. However,.
22
FIGURE 5
CORPORATE LOAN RATING SHEET
1. Deposit relationship .Not a depositor . . ............................ 0
Depositor..........  . I
Usually compensating balances . . 2
2. Use of other bank services . . . N o n e ........................... 0
Uses one other s e r v i c e ........1
Uses more than o n e ............ 2
3. Previous loans at this bank . . N o n e ........................... 0
Did not pay as agreed.......... 0
Paid as a g r e e d ................ . 2
4. Credit record . . . . . . . . .  No credit experience ...........  0
Derogatory credit ...............  0
Nominal derogatory credit . . . .  1
Favorable credit record ......... 2
5. Age of firm  ........... Less than one y e a r ................. 0
1 but less than 3 years . . . . .  1
3 but less than 5 y e a r s ........... 2
5 but less than 10 years . . . .  3
10 or more y e a r s .............. 4
6. Collateral pledged . . . . . . .  Unsecured . . . . . . . . . . . .  0
Partially secured ...............  1
Fully secured...................2
7. Bank's income from this loan . . Less than $ 5 0 ...................... 0
$50 but less than $ 1 0 0 ........ 1
$100 but less than $200 ...........2
$200 but less than $500 . . . . .  3
$500 or more  ....................4
8. Term of l o a n .............. .. . 5 years and over . . . . . . . .  0
1 year but less than 5 years . . 1
Less than 1 y e a r .............. 3
9. Firm's profit record ...........  Losses in last 5 years ......... 0
No profit history ...............  0
„ Fluctuating profits . . . . . . .  1
Constant profit level ........... 3
Generally increasing profits . . 5
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FIGURE 5-~Uontinued
10. Current r a t i o ................ . Less than 1.0/1.0 .  ...........
1.0/1.0 but less than 1.5/1.0 . . 
1.5/1,0 but less than 2.0/1.0 
2.0/1.0 and over . . . . . . . .
11. Acid test ratio . . . . . . . .  Less than 1.0/1.0 . . . . . .
1.0/1.0 and over .  ...........
12. Percentage equity capital Under 40% . . . . . . 
40% but less than 60% 
60% but less than 80% 
80% or more . . . . .
13. Total bank debt as % of equity . 50% or more .........
25% but less than 50% 
Less than 25% . . . .
14. Bank loan as % of working cap. . 100% or more . . . .
50% but less than 100% 
Less than 50% . . . .
Total score
Loan granted by bank ______ .
Loan declined by bank _____ _.
Loan loss or workout situation
W
M
O
 
Ms
) 
O 
»U
1U
 
O 
H* 
O 
t-
'N
JM
O
24
it is intended to point out that loan scoring is adaptable 
to corporate lending decisions. The apparent validity of 
this rating sheet will be discussed in Chapter IV and 
suggested improvements to and improvements of this rating 
sheet, will be discussed in Chapters V and VI.
Item 1. Deposit relationship. Perhaps the most often
mentioned and most widely discussed requirement of a
commercial banker in granting credit to a corporation is
that of the corporation having established a continuing
deposit relationship with the bank, and often the granting
of a- loan is contingent.upon the firm maintaining what are
known as compensating balances. Banks tend to give
preferential treatment to long-time customers. Thus, the
first question often asked of any potential borrower is:
"Are you a depositor of this bank?" Even large national
corporations of unquestionable credit worth are invariably
subject to this requirement because banks " . . .  long-term
deposit relationships which could be guaranteed effectively
17by concerns with long-term . . . [local] . . . interests."
Loans produce most of the profits of commercial banks 
and the greatest percentage of funds available for lending 
comes from the deposits of customers. Therefore, banks feel 
loyalty to first take care of the credit needs of its
17Ibid., p. 25.
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established deposit customers. Gee points out:
"The theory is that every business has a 
need of a bank account ‘&nd that, if it also 
has the -need of bank financing, the account 
should^properly be carried with the bank from 
which the business obtains its financing."18
Secondly, having had a deposit relationship with the bank,
the firm's ability to meet its obligations, its cash flow,
credit background and reputation in the community should be
well-known to the bank.
In addition to a prerequisite deposit relationship,
many commercial banks require that the firm maintain
compensating balances as discussed by Gee:
" . . .  [A]verage deposit balances should 
bear some reasonable relationship to average 
loans or the amount of a line of credit. Only 
in this way can the bank be assured of continued 
availability of loanable funds. Since legal and 
other reserve requirements may normally amount, 
roughly, to about 20 per cent of total deposits, 
each $1 of primary deposits with a bank should 
enable it, theoretically, to expand its loans 
through deposit account credits by about $5.
This gave rise to the old rule-of-thumb concept 
that, to be properly commensurate, account 
balances shpu-ld roughly average 20 per cent of 
the average loans to that customer."1^
Different authors, in discussing the compensating
balance requirement, take differing views as to the bank's
real motives for enforcing this requirement. Hayes, as do
Edward F. Gee, "The Seasonal Loan", in Business Loans 
of American Commercial Banks, ed. by Benjamin Haggot Beckhart 
(New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1959), p. 138.
19Ibid., pp. 138-39.
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most, other authors, points out with justification that
" . . . compensating balance policy is nothing more than
an indirect means of increasing the interest rate on the
effective usable amount of the loan. In other words,
a firm that would normally carry a balance of $2,000 in
its account and wished to borrow $3 5,000, would have to
borrow another $5,000 to deposit in its account to meet
the compensating balance requirement. Thereby, the firm
would be'paying interest, on the additional $5,000> raising
the effective rate on the borrowed capital actually needed
by approximately one-fifth.
Compensating balances and the enforcement of these
balances vary from bank to bank with " . . .  the use of
compensating-balance requirements . . . [being] . . . far
more'prevalent in urbanrareas where the competition for
deposits is keener and where borrowers have access to a.
21relatively large number of banks." These findings were
^Douglas A. Hayes, Bank Lending Policies, Issues and 
Practices, (Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan,.
1964), p. 77.
21Nevins D. Baxter and Harold T. Shapa.ro, "Compensating 
Balance. Requirements: The Results of a. Survey", journal
of Finance, September, 1964, p. 492.
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substantially reinforced in interviews with both. California 
bankers and Missoula bankers; the former emphasizing the 
importance of compensating balances and the latter 
acknowledging their limited local use.
Reed relates that compensating balance requirements
22are most strictly enforced during times of tight credit. 
Conversely, " . . .  [d]uring periods of easy money, when 
banks are seeking loan opportunities through which to put 
available funds to work, they may rarely stipulate any
23fixed requirements with respect to compensating balances."
Turning to the rating sheet, a firm that has not 
maintained an account with the bank is scored zero. As 
mentioned earlier, a bank may consider maintaining a 
deposit account as a prerequisite for a loan. Often, 
however, the banker will consider approving a loan, if he 
feels a meaningful deposit relationship will develop. Firms 
that have maintained deposit accounts are scored one point 
and those that have normally carried compensating balances 
(account balances averaging from one-sixth to one-fifth of 
the total proposed outstanding debt) are scored two points. 
The two points are given because of the firm's demonstrated 
ability to maintain the required balances and ability to
22Edward W. Reed, Commercial Bank Management (New 
York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1963), p. 474.
23Gee, p. 139.
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maintain working capital.
Item 2. Use of other bank services. In recent years 
commercial banks have tended to provide a greater number of 
services to their corporate customers. Furniss and ,Nadler 
point out that:
" . . .  [B]anking was originally aimed at
the well-to-do business organization or 
individual, offering few services in relation 
to the size of the checking account maintained.
And because of the relatively modest number of 
services requested, and the high profitability 
of the balances, banks traditionally offered such 
'incidental' services without extra c h a r g e . "^4
However, these services have been expanded to-included-:
payroll,services, trust services, maintenance of employee
pension plans, plans for payment of freight bills, stock
registry and transfer services, safety deposit, sales
financing through credit cards, and computer time sharing.
Banks now charge for these services and have found these
services to be increasingly profitable over the years. As
with compensating balances (discussed under Item 1), firms
that take advantage of these, additional services, which
contribute to the bank.'s overall income, will usually
receive preferential treatment.
24James P. Furniss and, Paul S. Nadler, "Should Banks 
Reprice Corporate Services?," Harvard Business Review, May- 
June, 1968, p. 96.
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Firms that take advantage of several services will be 
reluctant.to ̂ switch their affiliation because of the 
difficulties involved. Therefore, the bank is more assured 
that the firm will continue to take advantage of and value 
this relationship and the bank can feel more confident that 
the £Loah will be repaid as agreed. In fact, one California 
banker stated that, a major strategy of his bank (as with 
probably most, others) was to try to get. corporations to take 
advantage of all services possible, thereby increasing the 
difficulty of a particular firm to switch its allegiance to 
another bank. For example, it is relatively easy for a 
corporation to transfer its checking account, but if the 
firm has to reestablish payroll services,. trust services, 
pension plans, etc., it will be reluctant to seek another 
bank and will most likely remain with the same bank.
Larger banks, of course, provide a greater number of
these additional services. As will be discussed in. Chapter
IV, this particular item was ifound to have little importance
to Missoula bankers because of the relatively few additional
services provided by local banks. However, the preliminary1
intent of the scoring of this item was to give firms credit 
for the use of these services and the income they contribute 
the the commercial bank. In some cases, these services 
give the bank a Wider margin of profit than either service 
charge's oh checking accounts or interest earned on loans.
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For the reasons indicated above, firms that use no 
other bank services receive a score of zero. Firms using 
one other service are given one point and those that use 
more than one service are- given two points.
Item 3. Previous loans at -this bank. Obviously, if 
a bank has extended credit to a firm before, the bank has 
a reasonably good idea, how the firm handles its financial 
affairs. In most cases, previous loans will have been paid 
as agreed, as most firms are aware of the advantages of 
maintaining good rapport with creditors.
Even though a firm is experiencing moderate.financial 
difficulties at the time of its current application for 
credit, many bankers have a, feeling of continual commitment 
to a firm. That is, many bankers feel that firms need 
credit during both and good times and the volume of good 
business brought to the bank, during the good times will more 
than offset the additional risks incurred by the bank during 
difficult times.
In some cases, previous loans might.not have been paid 
as agreed. If the bank's experience has been too 
unfavorable, it will be unwilling to extend the firm 
additional credit under any circumstances. However, if 
there is a reasonable doubt in the mind of the lending 
officer, he might, want to continue his evaluation with the 
thought in mind that the firm's position had improved
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sufficiently to preclude the recurrence of the problem 
which had existed during the term of the previous loan. 
Hodgman contributes to this overall view by adding that:
" . . .  [B]angers are not psychologists or 
psychiatrists. Therefore., they are accustomed to 
judging a particular borrower's willingness to 
fulfill his obligations primarily in terms of 
his past performance unless there are: specific 
indications that this may b e  m i s l e a d i n g . "^5
Turning to the rating sheet, firms which have not Had
previous loans at the bank receive a score of zero in tHis
section because the bank would not have had firsthand
lending experience with the corporation. For obvious
reasons, firms which have not paid as agreed are simllarily
given a score- of zero. Firms that have had previous loans
and have paid as agreed are given two pointy.
Item 4. Credit record. Banks can obtain credit 
information on a firm from any number of sources. Prochnow 
and Foulke suggest the following sources: 1) Other banks;
2) trade accounts; 3) public records such as court proceed-
M -
ings; 4) rifewspapers, periodicals , and directories; arid 5)
professional services such as Dun and Bradstreet which rates
firms on their credit performance, management and financial 
2 6structure. Local credit- bureaus provide another source
Hodgman, p. 26.
26Herbert V. Prochnow and Roy A. Foulke, Practical Bank 
Credit, (Second Revised Edition;, New York: Harper & Row, ~
Publishers, 1963), pp. 52-53.
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of information but are of varying reliability. The • 
prospective borrower will undoubtedly also provide a number 
of leads with respect to sources of credit information..
Banks generally feel, with strong statistical support 
and for many of the same reasons discussed under Item 3, 
that firms that meet their financial obligations regularly- 
will continue, to do so because they have successfully been 
able to plan the repayment of obligations in the past.
In some cases an investigation will reveal nominal 
derogatory credit information. This is sometimes due to 
misunderstandings or simple oversights and the banker will 
usually not penalize a firm severely for this type of 
derogatory credit. However, if it can be shown in the 
credit investigation that these are more than incidental 
occurences; the firm, more than likely, has been, unable, 
unwilling Or negligent in meeting its obligations. Such a 
record reflects unfavorably on the management of a 
corporation.
Firms which have' either no credit experience or have 
derogatory credit records receive no points in this section. 
Those firms which have nominal derogatory credit receive 
one point and those firms with favorable credit records 
receive two points.
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Item 5. Age of firm. A firm that has been in business 
for a long period of time will havd*incurred a 
proportionately greater number of problems on the average 
and will have had to find solutions to these problems. The 
fact that a firm has remained in business over a considerable 
number, of years attests to its ability to overcome these 
problems and provides .^some "assurance ! that / it can continual to 
do so in. the future.
During the initial stages of development, - any particular 
firm will usually incur problems which call for the use' of 
untested solutions. The inexperience of management and an, 
untested organization add to these inherent risks of a new 
corporation. If nothing else, an older corporation should 
have also attained some degree of stability which will aid 
the lending officer in predicting the likelihood of the 
proposed loan being repaid as agreed.
For these reasons , older firms are given more points, 
with those over ten.years old receiving four points and the 
scores descending to zero points for those firms that have 
been in existence for less than one year.
Item 6. Collateral pledged. Bankers have traditionally 
sought fully secured loans to assure themselves that their 
principal will be returned to them. Except to A-l credit 
risks, older credit officers have felt that corporate 
profits could not be counted on for repayment, of loans and
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banks should, therefore, have some form of security which 
could readily be sold in case of default. Reed adds to this 
view by stating that:
"The- main: purpose of a bank requesting that a 
loan be secured is to reduce the bank's risk of 
loss in the event the borrower is unwilling or 
unable to repay the loa.n at maturity. Security 
does not assure that the loan will be repaid. It 
does, however, reduce the risk since the bank,, in 
the event of liquidation, becomes a preferred 
rather than a common creditor and takes precedence 
over the common, creditors in. the liquidation of assets."2/
Often a loan, officer has looked only toward holding 
readily marketable security to cover a loan and has not 
concerned himself particularily with the purpose of the 
loan; contenting himself with the fact that the loan is 
covered should the firm default. Experience has shown, 
however, that a firm that suffers losses and has surrendered 
collateral to a bank will likely be justifiably hostile to 
the^Jbahk. Had the lending officer concerned himself with 
the profitable investment of the loan proceeds, he might 
have saved the corporation" from difficulty and. saved an 
otherwise valuable customer for the bank.
In recent years, bankers have become more concerned 
with providing financial advice to their corporate customers 
and are more concerned with the profitable employment of 
funds rather than seeking protection of principal, per se.
^Reed, p. 168.
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Further, " . . .  [c]ontrary to popular belief,the largest 
loans that a bank may make and the greatest dollar volume 
of loans made by some banks are made on an unsecured basis. 
The largest, commercial borrowers borrow on an unsecured
U  • H 2 8basis.
Because of the potential advantages that accrue to the 
bank by having a loan fully secured, a firm that seeks a 
fully secured loan is given two points, one that offers some 
security is given one point, and one that seeks'an unsecured 
loan. is^given no points.
Item 7. Banks income, from this loan. A prime 
consideration of a bank in, granting credit, to a customer, 
other than hoping to retain the applicant as a depositor, 
is the bank' s income from the proposed loan.. "Marginal 
costs . . .increase as the size of loans decrease . . . .  
[with] . . . these higher costs of smaller loans accounting
for approximately 76 per cent, of the differential in
2Qmarginal earings between larger and smaller loans.jr In 
other words, a-bank will make a greater margin of profit on 
a larger loan simply because " . . .  [w]hile a $5,000 loan 
. . . does not require as much time as' a $500,000 loan, it
28Reed, p. 171.
29George J. Bens ton, "Commercial Bank Priq<e’ Idsqrimina- 
tion Against Small Loans , ".^Journal of Finance, December, 
1964, p. 631. !
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30[does] reqifire more than 1/100 as much time," For this 
reason, a straight interest rate is not used as a scoring 
criteria in this study.
As in. most, other lines of business, the banker is 
usually willing to incur a little greater risk in order to 
receive a larger income; income being a function of the 
amount of the loan., the rate charged, and the maturity. A 
firm requesting credit is scored higher for contributing 
greater income to the bank, with a maximum score of four 
points available.
Item 8. Term of loan. Bankers have traditionally 
preferred loans with short maturities for three main reasons. 
First> risks increase proportionately with the length of 
time that a loan is outstanding. A number of unforeseen 
situations, can arise which could alter the firm's ability 
to repay the loan. For example, the bank might make a loan 
to a corporation which is currently in what is considered 
a favorable industry because of the particular demands of 
the economy at a given^-itime. However,, as the demands of 
the economy change, this industry might: lose its preferred 
status and face reduced profits or even losses. By making 
a long term loan to a firm in this category, the bank would 
be locked in for a period of time that would exceed the
^Abate, p. 39.
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company's duration of strength. To avoid this type of risk, 
banks prefer to grant loans of short maturities„ A recent 
study by Edward I. Altman has produced results which would 
be very useful to bankers and supports the banker's 
contention that short term loans are safer. His study 
reveals that corporate bankruptcies can be predicted up to 
two years in advance and states, further, that " . . . the
accuracy [of prediction] diminishes substantially as the 
lead time increases."31
Secondly, the going interest rate can change over a 
period of time. If a banker lends money for an extended 
period at a low rate of interest, the banker might find at 
a later date that he might be paying more for his money than 
the borrower is paying. Or, more likely, the banker will 
find that his profit margin becomes insufficient to meet the 
expenses of carrying the loan. To avoid this difficulty, 
bankers will often required that the effective rate of 
interest charged on a loan will change with fluctuations in 
the prime rate. For example, a particular loan agreement 
may provide that the effective rate of interest on the loan 
will be maintained at one. per cent above prime. This device 
is useful in maintaining profit margins when interest rates 
are moving upwards.
31Edward I. Altman, "Financial Ratios, Discriminant 
Analysis and the Prediction of Corporate Bankruptcy," The 
Journal of Finance, September 1968, p. 604.
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Finally, banks do not provide equity or permanent 
working capital, and for that reason favor:
" . . .  the time honored practice of the 
'annual clean-up' which requires business 
borrowers to pay off their loans once each year.
It is thought that this assurance that such 
loans are not for capital or fixed asset 
purposes but are, instead, for the financing of 
current- assets and that, therefore', they possess 
greater liquidity as well as less r i s k . "3*
Because of the banker's strong preference for shQtt
term loans, firms desiring loans with maturities of less
than one year are given three points. Those firms desiring
loans with maturities of one year but less than five years
are given only one point and those firms desiring loans
with maturities of five years or more, receive no points.
Item 9. Firm's profit record. As corporate profits
are the intended source of repayment of a loan, this section
of the rating sheet has been weighted quite heavily. As
discussed under Item 6, the trend of bank lending decisions
has tended away from dependence -upon collateral and more
toward projected profits of the firm.
Because of the difficulties involved in making accurate
projections of a firm's earnings, past earnings are often
considered the best indicator of future profits. Historical
profits are, therefore, used as the basis for scoring on the
rating sheet. Even though a firm may suffer losses for a __
Reed, p. 303.
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period of time and then finally attains record earnings, 
bankers have a higher regard for firms that have either 
stable: or increasing profits. Bankers feel that these 
firms wild be likely to carry this trend into the future 
and feel that this trend is also an indication of good , 
management.
Turning to the scoring of this section, those firms 
which show profit growth are.:given the maximum of five 
points, those maintaining a reasonably constant profit 
level are given three points, and those firms with profits 
that fluctuate rather widely from year to year are given 
only one point. Firms without a profit history (new firms) 
and firms that have experienced any losses in the .last five 
years receive no. points.
Item IP. Current ratio. Ratios have long been an 
important tool of accountants, investors, and bankers.
Barry E. Miller suggests that:
"Ratio analysis is . . . particularly 
valuable in preliminary studies or in other 
situations where detailed figures are not 
readily available. The ratio technique, 
provides the analyst with a^uick picture of 
a company's fundamental financial condition, 
so that, he can determine what additional 
information he may need and what further 
analysis should be undertaken.
Barry E. Miller, "Ratio Analysis— A Modern Credit 
Tool," Bankers Monthly Magazine, August 15, 1966, p. 36.
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Although bankers usually analyze many ratios, the one ratio 
often accorded the,most, importance is the current ratio and 
it will, therefore, be one of the few ratios used on this 
rating sheet.
The "optimal" current ratio varies from industry to
industry. However, firms in general must be able to meet
current obligations as they become due plus hold some-; r
reserve funds to meet unexpected contingencies as they arise.
Robert Morris Associates publishes an annual study which
lists, for firms of a particular size range in any given
industry, average current ratios and ten other financial 
34ratios. This study provides useful guidelines for detailed 
financial analysis and is used by some local bankers.
As a minimuiji, a firm is expected to have a current, 
ratio of at least 1.0/1.0. Therefore, firms with less than 
1.0/1.0 ratio are given a score of zero. Firms with ratios 
of 1.0/1.0 but less than 1.0/1.5 are given one point and 
those, with ratios of 1.5/1.0 but less than 2.0/1.0 are given 
two points. Firms with ratios of 2.0/1.0 and over are given 
only one point. Although experimental, the theory here is 
that firms exceeding this ratio may be unprofitably holding 
excess cash or have too large inventories, or may not be 
aggressively collecting accounts receivable.
■^Robert Morris Associates, Annual Statement Studies,. 
(196,9 Edition), (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: Robert Morris
Associates, 1969).
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Item 11. Acid-test ratio. Another useful ratio is
the acid-test, or quick, ratio which is a test of a firm's
immediate solvency. Although similar to the current ratio,
only those current assets that can readily be converted into
cash are included. Inventories are not included because of
the time lapse which may occur in converting these assets
to cash. The- minimum acceptable 'acid-test ratio is
35considered to be 1.0/1,0.
As an acid-test ratio of 1.0/1.0 and over attests to the 
apparent' ' solvency of a corporation, those firms that 
have such a ratio are given one point. Those firms with a 
lower ratio are given.a score of zero.
Item 12. Percentage equity capital. Firms can 
generate a greater return on invested capital by increasing 
their use of leverage. Lindsay and Sametz point out:’
"The actual .location of the optimal leverage 
point or range for any given firm will vary with 
the amount of business uncertainty involved in 
its operations . . . .  This optimal range occurs 
at higher levels of leverage for stable industries 
than for unstable industries."
*5 C Roy A. Foulke, Practical Financial Statement 
Analysis (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1961),
p. 179- " U
36Robert Lindsay and Arnold W. Sametz, Financial 
Management: An Analytical Approach. (Homewood, Illinois:
Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1963), p. 327.
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However, as a firings use of leverage increases, the risk of 
loss during financial reversals will also increase. In the 
event of a forced liquidation, assets are sold at only a 
fraction of their book value. Therefore; if there are fewer 
debtors competing with the bank for the residual, the bank
is reasonably assured of its loan being repaid from the
/
proceeds.
As equity capital provides an excellent cushion of 
protection to the ljank in the event of a firm's bankruptcy, 
this section is given the heaviest weighting, with those' 
firms having equity capital equal to 80 per cent or more of 
total assets given seven points, declining to zero points 
for those firms With less than 40 per cent equity capital,.'
Item 13. Total bank debt as a percentage of equity.
For many of the same reasons discussed under Item 12, a bank 
is concerned with how much of a firm's capital it is 
supplying. Owners of a- corporation should normally accrue 
the greatest income from the firm and, therefore, should be 
assuming the greatest share of the risk. Consequently, the 
owners should have considerably more invested in the firm 
than the bank. Similarly, most banks feel that other 
creditors should provide part 15f a firm's financing needs. 
Adding to this, most bankers like to feel that a firm is 
of such substantial strength that it can or,acquire funds 
from any number of sources. The fact that a,firm is
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borrowing from other creditors gives the banker confidence 
(though perhaps illusory) in the f irmr' s'- strength.
For these reasons, firms that request an amount in 
excess of 50 per cent of invested capital (equity) are 
scored zero, those.that wish to borrow 25 per cent but less 
than 50 per cent of invested capital are given two points 
and those that wish to borrow less than 2 5 per cent of 
invested capital are given four points.
Item 14. Total bank debt as a percentage of working
capital. Bankers are primarily interested in loaning
capital for short periods of time. And, a s pointed out
earlier, are not interested in meeting the total capital
needs of a particular firm because of the risks involved.
Bankers, in general, are willing to lend an amount not to
37exceed 50 per cent of the firm's working capital. The 
primary reason for this is that the bank feels that if the 
firm needs amounts in excess of this percentage, it is in a 
weak current position and perhaps should take action on its 
own to correct the difficulties.
Firms requesting loans in excess of their working 
capital are given zero points, those requesting a loan 
equal, to 50 per cent but less than 100 per cent are given
37Royce Diener, "Analyzing the Financing Potential of 
a Business," in The Financing of Small, Business, ed. by 
Irving Pfeffer (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1967),
p. 217.
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one point and those firms requesting an amount less than 
50 percent of working capital are given three points.
o • o
Chapter IV will describe how this rating sheet, was 
tested for validity in the.Missoula area and provide the 
results of that study.
CHAPTER IV
CORPORATE LENDING POLICIES OF LOCAL COMMERCIAL BANKS
Three leading Missoula area commercial banks were 
approached to: 1) Solicit opinions and suggestions from
their corporate lending officers as to the merits of the 
"Corporate Loan Rating Sheet" described in Chapter III, and 
2) to test the continuity of this rating sheet with actual 
lending officer/committee decisions by gaining ̂ access to a 
sampling of the corporate-loan files of these banks. As 
explained to these bankers, the purpose of the study was 
not to evaluate the credit judgment of any bank nor its 
lending officers and because of the confidential nature of 
the information desired, complete anonymity would be 
maintained.
A number of corporate lending officers were interviewed 
at the three Missoula banks. All were apparently favorably 
impressed with the purpose and scope of the study and felt 
that the items included in the rating sheet were probably 
those factors most pertinent to the lending decision.. Two 
or three officers, however, suggested that the industry of 
a firm should be taken into consideration. As pointed out 
in Chapter III under Item 8, certain industries, because 
of their stability and the needs of the economy, are
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considered to be better financial risks. However, to 
preserve anonymity in Missoula's small area, where there 
would perhaps be just one or just a few firms in an 
industry; industry considerations were excluded for purposes 
of this particular study.
In carrying out the intent of this portion of the 
study-evaluating the validity of the rating sheet— several 
problems were anticipated. Although generating enthusiasm 
for the study and attesting to its merits, one bank felt v 
that it could not make its files available for the study.
The second bank cooperated fully in the study, making the 
reguested files available and providing access to their 
corporate lending officers who aided in interpreting 
information within the various files and providing informa- 
•fcio^feissing^ffom-.the..-fi l e k £■ :/■ ‘ The third bank, as did the 
first bank, felt that it could not make its files available, 
but a senior lending officer volunteered to examine a 
sampling of corporate loan application files for the 
necessary date and score those applications. Because of 
limitations on this officer's time, the sample from this 
bank was small but did contribute significantly to the 
study.
Loan files in three categories were purveyed: 1)
Loans to corporations which had been approved by the banks, 
2) loans that had been declined by the banks, and 3) loans
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which had either been losses or workout situations for the 
banks. Although corporate loan losses are minimal for 
most banks, they do occur. Perhaps more frequently 
encountered, however, is the workout situation. In a work­
out situation a corporation is unable to repay a given loan 
as agreed and the bank must work out terms which will enable 
the corporation to eventually repay the loan, without 
forcing the firm 'into bankruptcy or foreclosing on or 
selling any security pledged. While the bank, in under­
taking a workout situation, is reasonably assured of 
protecting its principal, enough concessions are usually 
made to the firm that no earnings are realized from the
iloan. In fact, because of the time required of the lending 
officer— in some cases, such as a loan secured by accounts 
receivable, daily followup is often required--unquantifiable 
losses do accrue to the bank. For these reasons it is 
important that commercial banks avoid both losses and work­
out situations.
As the corporate loan rating sheet was experimental 
and previously untried, difficulties in scoring available 
loan files were anticipated. Two items on the list 
presented some difficulty. In scoring "Use of other bank 
services" (Item 2), it was found that local banks do not 
offer a myriad of other services to corporations and, . 
therefore, their income from this source is negligible.
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Further, information concerning the use of these services 
by the corporations being studied was not available in the 
files and it was felt that.the time required of bank 
officers to ascertain this information would not be 
justified. Therefore, Item 2 was deleted from the scoring. 
However, for the reasons pointed out in Chapter III, this
item is felt to be valid and its use would perhaps find
greater justification in scoring the loans of larger banks.
"Bank's income from this loan" (Item 7) presented a
second problem as the scale of dollar amounts should have 
been revised upwards. In other words, a great many of the 
loans surveyed would realize earnings of at least $500 and 
very few were at the lower levels. However, there were a 
number of loans with earnings below $500, so the item 
remained included.
Results of the scoring in the sample are shown in 
Figures 6 and 7. Although this sample was relatively small, 
Figure 6 shows that all but one of the loans in the category 
"granted" scored at least twenty-one points. Conversely, 
all but one of the loans the banks declined and all but one 
of the loans in the "loss or workout situation" category 
scored less than twenty-one points. Thus, it can be said 
that had the banks been using this rating sheet and had they 
arbitrarily approved all loans that scored twenty-one points 
or over and had declined all those that fell below this score;
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they would have approved, with one exception, all the loans 
that were actually granted which have not become loss or 
workout situations. Similarly, all but one of the loans 
declined by the banks would have also been declined. Most 
importantly, five of the six loans made by the banks in the 
"loss or workout -situation" category would not have been 
granted under the scoring system--saving the bank from 
substantial losses.
In each of the three categories— granted, declined, and 
loss-or workout situation-«>one loan fell outside the general 
scoring range for the category. In each-case special 
circumstances existed. For example, the officer who 
declined the loan that scored twenty-five points explained 
the circumstances. The firm had been regarded as an. 
excellent credit risk and the bank was willing to lend it 
money, but the money was intended for use outside the 
Missoula area. The bank in reinforcing its policy (as is 
the policy of almost all banks, as mentioned earlier) of 
serving the needs of the community, declined the loan only 
on this basis.
Conversely, the loan which was granted that scored only 
eighteen points was probably recognized by the lending 
officer(s) involved as not being a strong credit risk but 
was for purposes of substantial interest to the community 
of Missoula and was probably granted partially on this 
basis.
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In the "Loss or workout situation" category, scoring 
for the loan that scored twenty-three points was based upon 
what could be considered insufficient and unverified 
information. In other words, there is some question as to 
the validity of the information supplied by the corporation 
and more substantial information might have provided the 
loan with a lower score.
Looking at the results of this study from another 
perspective, Figure 7 shows that loans granted by the bank 
scored, on the average, almost ten points higher than those 
declined by the bank (27.1 vs. 17.5). Even more striking, 
loans granted by the bank, which have not become a problem, 
scored on the average almost, thirteen points higher than 
those in the "loss or workout situation" category (27.1 vs.
14.8) .
While not providing conclusive evidence as to the 
validity of the experimental score sheet developed in this 
study, the results serve two useful purposes. First, this 
study shows that credit scoring is readily adaptable to the 
corporate lending decision. Secondly, the study shows that 
even this experimental rating sheet can provide the corporate 
lending officer with a picture of the overall strength of 
a given corporation.
It might be noted at this time that commercial bankers 
refer to loans in the category covered in this study 
generally as "commercial loans" rather than as "corp<ip?3ate
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lgafns. For purposes of this study, banks were asked to 
provide files on loans to corporations, or at least 
proprietorships and partnerships that had substantially the 
same general characteristics as corporations, the reason 
being that loans to firms in the latter categories are often 
based on the personal wealth of individuals or families, 
rather than on the strength of the firms. Loan files of 
firms with "corporate characteristics" were, therefore, 
felt to better meet;the purposes of this study in testing 
the experimental rating sheet.
As a rating sheet of this type is designed only as a 
screening'device,not all areas of financial importance are 
taken into consideration. A rating sheet does, however, 
focus the attention of the lending officer on a number of 
areas, any one of which may either preclude a firm from 
being eligible for credit or point out the need for attention 
by officers of the firm.
Chapter V will attempt to provide some insight into the 
in-depth evaluation that should be done by corporate lending 
officers before granting a loan to those firms that have 
passed the initial screeding process described in this 
chapter.
CHAPTER V
OTHER CONSIDERATIONS IN CORPORATE LOAN ANALYSIS
The preceding chapter shows that a credit scoring 
sheet can give a commercial bank some assurance, if only- 
statistical, that a corporation will be able to repay a 
proposed loan'. However, any number of factors, which 
might not be revealed on a score sheet, can effect a 
corporation's repayment ability; and it is these factors 
which the corporate loan officer will seek to identify 
and analyze after the application has passed this initial 
screening phase.
Gee asserts that there are only three sources of
repayment for a corporate loan: 1) Turning an asset into
cash, 2) acquiring additional capital, and 3) borrowing 
38elsewhere. in most cases the first source would be the 
most desirable, with the asset being purchased with the 
loan proceeds generating the funds to repay the loan. By 
looking at the purpose of a loan, a lending officer can 
gain some insight as to the intended source or repayment 
and the feasibility of the loan being repaid from this 
intended source.
3 8 i i c:Gee, p. 115.
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Figure -8 shows the functional types of capital and 
uses of capital with respect to any given firm over a given 
period of time. If funds are intended for seasonal or 
cyclical needs (fluctuating capital), then repayment would 
be expected at the time of the firm's greatest period of 
liquidity— as assets are converted into cash. A short term 
loan would then be appropriate to the needs of the firm.
For purposes of expanding a firm's operation, funds are 
required which will be amortized (repaid) by profits 
generated from the assets acquired. Either intermediate or 
long term funds would be appropriate but the term of the 
loan should not exceed the useful life of the asset nor 
should the balance outstanding on the loan at any given 
time exceed the value of the asset. Permanent capital is 
needed for both plant and equipment and for normal 
operations. A substantial portion of this capital should 
be provided by equity with the balance being provided by 
long term debt. Here agajin,the term of the loan should not 
exceed the useful life of the asset nor.exceed the value of 
the asset at any given time.
Most corporations are aware of the advantages accrued 
to the stockholders by maximizing the firm's leverage 
position. To facilitate maximizing leverage, many firms 
try to lengthen the average maturity of their debt. In 
other cases, a firm will unknowingly or unwittingly not
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match its .repayment schedule to its anticipated cash 
inflows. An experienced loan officer will usually 
recognize attempts by a firm to lengthen the average 
maturity of its debt and will make those changes necessary 
to align repayment schedules with cash inflow. Similar 
action will be taken for those firms that are unaware of 
the potential difficulties involved. In other cases, some 
firms will be unable to obtain long term funds for 
expansion and will seek to finance long term needs with 
short, term funds. As the iassets acquired do,.not generate 
enough profits over the short, term of the loan repayment; 
the firm is forced into refinancing with the lender, 
seeking another source of funds, or selling the assets 
involved. Any one of these solutions will probably not be 
desired by any or all of the parties involved. By 
realistically financing from the outset, the firm could 
avoid these difficulties. l '
As mentioned in earlier chapters, ratio analysis has 
long been used by the lending officer in evaluating the 
credit worthiness of a firm. Through ratio analysis the 
lending officer can; 1) Determine the overall strength of 
a given firm, 2) compare the ratio structure of the firm ' 
with other firms in the.industry, and 3) compare present 
ratios of the firm with past ratios to establish growth 
patterns. To facilitate ratio analysis, most bankers use
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a "spread sheet" similar to that shown in Figure 9. As 
different firms use different methods of accounting, the 
spread sheet is also useful in providing uniformity of 
classification and comparability of the different firm’s 
statements. Growth of the firm and the growth and 
stability of the firm's earnings can also be determined 
from the spread sheet. It probably goes without saying 
that audited statements for the firm are at least desirable, 
if not an absolute must. Davis and Gee refer to the 
importance of five-basic ratios for corporate loan 
analysis, which are substantially the same as those shown 
on the second page of the illustrated spread sheet.39
In addition to ratio analysis, Murray suggests that 
there are a number of symptoms that indicate impending 
trouble for a firm and should be recognized as such by the 
lending officer:
1) Slowing down of'the collection of receivables 
and a rise, in actual charge-offs of 
uncollectible accounts,
2) Accumulation of slowly moving or overpriced 
inventory,
3) Heavy investment in fixed assets,
4) Excessive withdrawals from the business,
5) Rapid expansion of volume without adequate 
permanent capital,
39Carlisle R. Davis, and Edward F. Gee, Analyzing 
Financial Statements {-'Rev. ed.; New York: American
Institute of Banking, 1966), pp. 162-171.
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SPREAD SH EET
OF BORROWER'S FINANCIAL STATEMENT
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FIGURE 9— Continued
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6) Failure to control expenses in various 
categories in line with volume of sales,
7) Unwarranted rise in accounts payable or 
other forms of debt, and
8) Finally, a gradual exhaustion of the 
ability to borrow which signals the 
arrival of a truly critical situation in 
the affairs of the enterprise.40
This last item ̂ reflects the security bank officers feel
when a firm is able to borrow from a number of sources as
discussed under Item 13 of Chapter III. In general, ^
favorable trends indicate, good management and poor trends
indicate the opposite. The'lending officer then is much
interested in establishing the existence of these trends
for his analysis.
Because debt is repaid from cash, cash flow analysis
is necessary to determine if cash flow will be sufficient
to cover repayment of the proposed debt as scheduled. The
cash flow cycle is defined by Heyer as follows: "Cash is
expended for inventory which, when turned into finished
goods and sold, becomes receivables which when liquidated, 
41become cash." Heyer's article deals with changes m  
credit analysis and he goes on to point out the need for 
lending officers to become more familiar with this type of 
analysis because cash flow analysis differs from other
40Murfay, pp. 85-86.
41Howard C. Heyer, "Changes in Credit Analysis," 
Bankers Monthly Magazine, March 15, 1966, p. 39.
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types of analysis by not being:
" . . .  a stationary concept based upon one 
historical set of data related to another,
historical set of data, but is rather a flow
concept--that is, an analysis of how much cash 
will come in and when,' 2
Cash flow analysis, therefore, requires more skill and
effort on the part;of both the banker and the firm.
Because of this, some firms will be reluctant to provide
the necessary information and will have to be educated
to willingly provide this information to the banker.
In some cases ratio analysis might indicate that a
firm may not be a good credit risk, particularly in the
case of a new firm. Miller suggests that in. such eases,
ratio analysis may not be providing the banker with a clear
picture and the bank might, be doing the firm a disservice
by refusing it a loan. Miller supports Heyer's view, then,
suggesting that cash flow analysis could bring a firm's
financial position more clearly into perspective:
"In many cases involving'trapidly growing 
companies, a lender has the choice of 
encouraging a reduction! ef expansion on= one'hand, 
or on the other, recognizing the'need to extend 
or increase outstanding loans for a prolonged 
jxeriod, perhaps on an inventory or accounts 
receivable basis. Credit analysts and loan of­
ficers -..must- fully understand projections of 
sources -and applications of funds--and the under­
lying .xatio analysis of financial statements--in ^
order to anticipate such situations well in advance."
42Ibid., p . 40.
43Miller, p. 36.
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Interviews with corporate lending officers indicated that 
cash flow analysis has not been used extensively by 
commercial bankers up to this time. However, as time 
passes, more lending officers will probably seek to perfect 
their skill and utilize more fully this tool of analysis.
Less quantitative is the lending officer's evaluation 
of a firm's management.and the outlook for a firm and its 
industry. Besides evaluating current management, the 
lending officer has to consider what effect possible changes 
in management will have on the profitability and coop­
erativeness of a firm. The outlook of a given firm, is 
dependent upon a-'number of factors not the least of which 
is changes in the economy. Chapters III and IV briefly de^ 
•scribed': industry characteristics and how they can affect" 
the ability of a firm to repay a given loan. As an example, 
the highly competitive electronics industry is largely 
dependent upon the often-irregular awarding of government 
contracts which, in turn, are awarded on the basis of 
competitive bids. It is difficult enough to predict the 
demands of the industry, let alone having to predict the 
probability of any particular firm being awarded a contract.
In,order to perfect their position, banks often make 
loans contingent upon the firm's willingness to accept 
certain restrictive covenants imposed upon the firm's 
freedom to manage its affairs. Such covenants usually 
restrict: 1) The use of loan proceeds, 2) acquisition and
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disposition of assets, 3) creation of other indebtedness,
4) officers' salaries, and 5) dividends or the distribution 
44of earnings. The reasons behind such restrictions are
purportedly:
" . . .  1) the general economic risks bearing 
on the companies during the life of the loan 
are [un]acceptable to the bank, 2) companies 
that need substantial amounts of . . . money 
are often under some financial strain, 3) such 
companies may inadvertently or voluntarily 
engage in practices or execute transactions 
which may jeopardize their ability to repay the 
loan, arid 4) as the bank must live with these 
borrowers for a period of [time], provisions 
designed to restrain such practices or trans­
actions are desirable. "^5
However, Hayes goes on to point out that " . . .  a weak
credit cannot be converted into a strong one by specific
46promises to do certain things or refrain from doing things.
Once a loan application has undergone the process
described herein, the corporation and the bank come to an
agreement which Hester refers to as a "loan offer function"
and describes as:
" . . .  a relation which specifies the terms 
at which a bank with particular characteristics 
is willing to lend to a borrower with a known 
profit, balance sheet, and credit history and
44Prochnow and Foulke, p. 47 9.
45Hayes, p. 110.
46Ibid.
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47with particular prospects for the future."
Although not all-inclusive, this chapter provides an 
insight into the methods used by corporate loan officers 
and suggests some areas that should be emphasized to enhance 
the analytical ability of these officers. Chapter VI will 
provide a structured guide to corporate loan analysis, tying 
the various steps of the process together in a workable 
sequence.
47 ;. Donald D. Hester, "An Empirical Examination of a 
Commercial Bank Loan Offer Function," in Analytical Methods 
in Banking, ed. by Kalman J . Cohen and Frederick S . Hammer 
- (Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1966), p. 178.
CHAPTER VI
A STRUCTURED GUIDE TO CORPORATE 
LOAN ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS
To facilitate corporate loan evaluation, the questions 
contained in Figure 10 are recommended for incorporation 
into a lending guide for commercial banks. Although most 
banks will have used many, if not all of these criteria at 
one time or another; other banks have probably omitted many 
of these-items from their evaluations, or at least have not 
used them consistently. Use of such a guide should reduce 
a bank's exposure to loan loss and, if nothing else, should 
provide continuity to the bank's lending policies.
Because of the time saved in screening applicants for 
corporate loans, the adoption of a. rating sheet similar to 
that shown in Figure 5. is recommended. As pointed out in 
Chapter IV, even this experimental rating sheet could be 
used to establish the overall credit strength of a firm as 
it had considerable validity in predicting loan losses for 
the banks sampled. Modifications such as those suggested 
in Chapter IV and the addition of items which would reflect 
the individual preferences and local conditions of the 
commercial bank involved would provide an excellent starting 
point for the corporate lending guide adopted by an 
individual commercial bank.
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FIGURE 10 
CORPORATE LENDING GUIDE
1. Areas requiring special attention on the rating sheet. 
List and explain why.
2. Areas requiring special attention on the spread sheet-. 
List and explain why.
3. Purpose of the loan:
a. Seasonal _______
b. 'Expansion  _____
c. Normal operations ______
d. Plant and equipment ______ .
4. Term of the loan:
a. Short term (less than one year) ______
b. Intermediate term (one to five years) _
c. Long term (five years and over) ______ .
5. Do items 3 and 4 correlate?
6. Will anticipated revenues provide sufficient coverage 
to repay the loan as scheduled?
7. Will the useful life of the equipment being purchased
exceed the term of the loan?
8. Will the value of the equipment being purchased exceed 
the amount outstanding on the loan at any given time?
9. Would loans for this purpose normally be financed by
equity capital?
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FIGURE 10— Continued
10. Is the firm experiencing steady growth?
11. Does equity increase proportionately with the growth
of the firm?
13. Industry classification of the firm:
a. Manufacturing ______
b. Sales  _____
c. Service ______ .
14. Sources of income to the firm:
a. Dependent upon bidding ______
b. Dependent upon other firms (job shop) ______.
15. Is the corporation dependent upon a few key customers
for business?
16. Sales force:
a. Direct sales ______
b* Wholesale ______
c. Independent agents used _______.
17. Are profits growing steadily?
18. Profit margin:
a . Low volume/high markup ______
b. High volume/low markup _______.
19. Are profit margins narrowing?
20. Can supplies be readily obtained from a number of
sources,, or will loss of the prime source of supply 
effect the corporation's production?
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FIGURE 10— Continued
21. Fixed costs:
a. High ______
b. Moderate ______
c. Low _____  .
22. Are receivables kept current?
23. Do withdrawals of funds by officers appear excessive?
24. Do accounting methods used by the firm appear to be 
sound and provide for a maximum tax advantage to the 
firm?
25. Does management appear to have a successful record?
26. Is management transient?
27. What effect would loss of key management personnel . 
have on the firm?
28. Are losses of key management personnel expected in the 
near future such as .through retirement?
29. Is the corporation sufficiently diversified to meet 
the needs of a changing economy?
30. Are labor relations problems anticipated and what 
effect would these have on the firm?
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As words sometimes have more meaning than figures, a 
list of questions such as those shown in Figure 10 would 
help assure that the meaning of financial statements are 
understood and would assure that items of importance would 
not be overlooked. Spread sheets would continue to be an 
important tool of the banker as they do provide a common 
arrangement for the financial Statements of many diverse 
firms, making comparisons and analysis much easier. As the 
spread sheet illustrated in Figure 9,is perhaps, one of the 
more complete ones, it is assumed that banks would use one 
of a similar structure.
Although not all-inclusive, the questions suggested on 
the "Corporate Lending Guide" are recommended for inclusion 
in analyzing those firms which have passed the initial 
screening process as provided for on the "Corporate Loan 
Rating Sheet." (Figure 5) . Here again, individual banks 
would be expected to make changes, additions, and exclusions 
which would reflect the individual preferences and local 
conditions of the bank involved.
As asserted at the outset of this study, the corporate 
loan rating sheet and lending guide contained herein are 
not intended as finalized products. However, the purpose 
of this study is to point out the potential of such devices 
in terms of: 1) Protecting a commercial bank from
potential losses on. corporate loans, 2) providing continuity
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to the loan policies of a commercial bank, 3) saving valuable 
time for corporate lending officers, and 4) serving as a 
training device for inexperienced lending officers. This 
study should have pointed out the potential value of such 
guides in each of these areas and it is recommended that 
commercial banks pursue the development of guides similar 
to those illustratedi
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